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We show that deviations from the law of one price in tradable goods are an important source
of violations of absolute PPP across countries. Using highly disaggregated export data, we document
systematic international price discrimination: at the U.S. dock, U.S. exporters ship the same good to
low-income countries at lower prices. This pricing-to-market is about twice as important as any local
non-traded inputs, such as distribution costs, in explaining the diﬀerences in tradable prices across
countries. We propose a model of consumer search that generates pricing-to-market. In this model,
consumers in low-income countries have a comparative advantage in producing non-traded, non-market
search activities and therefore are more price sensitive than consumers in high-income countries. We
present cross-country time use evidence and evidence from U.S. export prices that are consistent with
the model.
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Figure 1 plots income per capita against the price level and draws a line with the estimated
magnitude of this relation. This picture raises two questions: First, why are there large diﬀerences
in price levels? Absolute PPP states that the same basket of goods should sell for the same price
everywhere, yet for instance, the price level in Mexico is 70 percent below the price level in the United
States.1 Second, why are price levels so strongly related to income per capita? A doubling of income
per capita is associated with a 43 percent higher price level. The conventional explanation for these
two observations is the model of Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964), and Samuelson (1964), the HBS model
hereafter. In HBS, diﬀerences in price levels are driven solely by non-tradable goods, for which the
law of one price (LOP) doesn’t hold. Since the LOP holds for traded goods, international relative
wages are determined by the large productivity diﬀerences in tradables. Large diﬀerences in wages
lead to diﬀerences in the price of non-tradables, a sector in which productivity diﬀerences are much
smaller across countries. The model therefore rests on the assumption that cross-country productivity
1Rogoﬀ (1996) provides a review of PPP.
1diﬀerences are much smaller in non—tradables than in tradables, and that the LOP holds in tradables.2
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There are two good reasons to doubt HBS as a full explanation of these observations. First, we
see from Figure 2, which plots the tradable price levels against income per capita, that the LOP for
tradables is clearly violated in the data. As in Figure 1, the relationship between prices and income is
positive and signiﬁcant, and the estimated elasticity in tradables (0.26) is over 50 percent of the overall
elasticity (0.43).3 Deviations from the LOP are clearly substantial. Second, to explain the magnitude
of the relation in Figure 1, the rise in relative productivity of tradables with income across countries
(in the cross-section) would have to be much bigger than what we observe within countries (in the time
series).
One aim of this paper is to estimate the role of systematic price discrimination across countries,
what Krugman (1987) calls pricing-to-market, in the pattern of tradable and overall price levels in
2A few existing theories present alternatives to HBS. Kravis and Lipsey (1983) and Bhagwati (1984) focus on diﬀerences
in factor endowments. Linder (1961), Dornbusch (1988), Neary (1988) and Bergstrand (1991) focus on diﬀerences in
preferences. All of these theories assume that the LOP holds for tradables.
3These deviations from PPP are quite persistent. Of the 115 countries in the 1996 PWT data, 60 countries had a price
less than one-half of the U.S. price for a common basket of ﬁn a lg o o d s .O ft h e s e6 0c o u n t r i e s ,w eh a v ed a t af o r3 2o ft h e m
in 1985. Over 80 percent (26 out of 32) also had price levels less than one-half that of the U.S. in 1985. Countries with
low price levels also have very low income, with GDP per capita on average 14 percent of the U.S. level in 1996.
2Figures 1 and 2. The evidence on tradables in Figure 2 could be interpreted as direct evidence of pricing-
to-market, but a potential problem with such an interpretation is that the tradable prices are measured
using ﬁnal goods prices. These diﬀerences in retail prices may be driven by non-traded components,
such as transportation and distribution, instead of diﬀerences in the actual price of tradables earned by
the producer. In Section 2, we overcome this measurement problem using highly disaggregate data on
exports by destination market and show that the tradable price vs. income per capita relationship from
Figure 2 primarily reﬂects pricing-to-market rather than the non-traded content of tradable goods.
The data we study are well-suited for isolating this pricing-to-market because they measure the
export income received at the U.S. border before any local non-traded inputs are added. The data show
that exporters systematically charge higher prices for comparable goods when exporting to high-income
countries. On average the richest country in our data set pays 40 percent more for the same good than
the poorest country. We perform robustness checks that support our interpretation of this as true price
discrimination, and not the result of quality diﬀerences or transfer pricing of related party trade. The
estimated elasticity of price with respect to GDP per capita is 0.17, indicating that about two-thirds
of deviations in the LOP in ﬁnal tradables could be due to pure pricing-to-market.
What characteristics of consumers or markets might lead ﬁrms to price discriminate based on
income? The second aim of this paper is to propose a strong candidate for a micro-level explanation for
higher elasticities of demand from consumers in low-wage countries. In Section 3, we develop a model
based on consumer search frictions and international productivity diﬀerences. Search requires time,
which consumers in high-productivity/high-wage countries value at a premium. They are therefore less
willing to search and less price elastic shoppers. Firms take this into account and set relatively high
prices (and therefore markups) when selling to high-wage countries. Thus, there is a tight (endogenous)
link between the local wage and prices, both tradable prices and non-tradable prices. Our consumer
search story parallels and complements the HBS story. That is, we too rely on small diﬀerences in the
productivity of a non-traded good. The search friction story requires that productivity in shopping
rises less rapidly with income than productivity in market production.
3Section 4 provides a quantitative analysis of the search model, which can account for two-thirds
of the observed pricing-to-market relationship, and 57 percent of the PPP-income relationship, or about
twice as much as the HBS model alone explains. The existence of pricing-to-market augments the HBS
explanation in two ways. It helps reconcile the smaller observed diﬀerences in the relative price of
tradables to non-tradables, and it also helps reconcile large diﬀerences in average price levels with the
evidence that relative productivity in the tradable sector does not increase nearly as much with income
(in the time series) as the HBS explanation would require (in the cross-section of countries).
Corroborating evidence, which we review, supports the consumer search model as a strong
candidate explanation for the pricing-to-market we observe. First, we show, using cross-country time-
use studies, that the ratio of shopping time to work time increases substantially with income, which
indicates that shopping productivity does not increase as rapidly as income (and overall productivity).
Second, within countries, time-use studies ﬁnd that poorer consumers, and retired consumers with
lower opportunity cost of time, spend relatively more time shopping per purchase (McKenzie and
Schargrodsky, 2005, and Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). Furthermore, these studies ﬁnd that shopping time
is negatively related to purchase price, a direct implication of the search model. Third, our U.S.
export evidence shows that the opportunity cost of time (wage) is more robustly associated with prices
than with income, and that pricing-to-market is strongest for consumer goods. Finally, quantitatively,
numerical examples indicate that the search model can potentially generate pricing-to-market of the
order observed in the U.S. export data.
In addition to its contribution to the study of absolute PPP, this paper relates to two other
literatures. Our emphasis on pricing-to-market in tradables as an important source of violations from
absolute PPP is consistent with the prevailing view in the literature on relative PPP. Engel (1999) and
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) show that deviations from the LOP in tradables account for nearly
a l lo ft h eﬂuctuations in real exchange rates among developed countries.4 Theoretical explanations of
this pricing-to-market take two forms. The ﬁrst approach focuses on the role of sticky prices set in local
currencies, while the second emphasizes that local market conditions diﬀer across countries and time so
4Asea and Mendoza (1994) show that the HBS model is inconsistent with real exchange rate and output ﬂuctuations.
4that ﬁrms have incentive to systematically price discriminate internationally.5 Since we are looking at
absolute PPP and long term deviations, we follow the approach of focusing on local market conditions.
This paper also relates to the literature on the role of relative prices and productivities in capital
accumulation and growth. Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007) demonstrate that
relative price diﬀerences across countries are important in explaining cross-country variation in capital
stocks and income levels. Hsieh and Klenow therefore argue that understanding the origins of these
relative price and productivity diﬀerences is essential. We argue that pricing-to-market, and not only
relative productivities, plays a role in the prices (of investment, for example) that countries face.
2. Pricing-to-Market: Empirics and Importance
In this section, we document evidence, using highly disaggregated data on U.S. exports, that U.S.
ﬁrms systematically price discriminate based on the income of the destination market. We show that
this price discrimination is not likely due to unobserved quality diﬀerences or transfer pricing issues,
and that it provides some evidence for a search model where the elasticity of demand varies with the
opportunity cost of search. Finally, using a modiﬁed version of Engel’s (1999) decomposition of real
exchange rates, we ﬁnd that pricing-to-market accounts for 40 percent of the aggregate price-income
relationship and the non-traded component of ﬁnal goods accounts for 20 percent.
A. Export Data
The micro data we analyze, U.S. Exports Harmonized System data (see Feenstra et al., 2002),
have signiﬁcant advantages over the aggregate data in identifying pricing-to-market in tradables.
First, the data are comprehensive of all U.S. domestic exports (excluding re-exports) and there-
fore include only tradable goods, and a much broader range of tradables. We have annual data on the
total value and quantity of all commodities exported by destination country. We link these data to
income per capita data from the Penn World Tables 6.1 for the years 1989-2000 and to hourly (man-
ufacturing) wage data available from the BLS. These wages are reported in nominal local currency,
5Starting with Krugman (1987), the local market condition models have sought to explain diﬀerences in elasticities of
demand across countries from ﬁrst principles without resorting to diﬀerences in tastes. A variety of local market condition
models exist and emphasize both supply considerations, such as diﬀerences in industry structure (Dornbusch, 1987), and
demand considerations, such as the decisions of ﬁrms to build market shares (Alessandria, 2004b).
5which we convert to international Gheary-Khamis dollars using the PWT PPP price level.6
Given our emphasis on search and the opportunity cost of time, we focus on countries for which
both hourly wage and income per capita data are available. These 28 countries include most long-term
members of the OECD plus Hong Kong, Israel, South Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Taiwan.
Over the 12 years of data, we have 1.1 million good-year observations for these countries, constituting
7 8p e r c e n to ft h ev a l u eo fU . S .e x p o r t s .
The second crucial advantage of this export data is that they are collected “at the dock” of the
U.S., and so exclude local non-traded inputs in the destination market. That is, our export prices are
based on free-alongside-ship values,7 so they do not include transportation costs, tariﬀs, or distribution
and retailing costs in the importing country. One complication, however, is that we do not directly
observe prices. Instead, we calculate unit values from data on the total value and quantity sold.
Numerous important studies of deviations of the LOP and pricing-to-market are based on unit values
(see Isard, 1977, Feenstra, 1989, and Knetter, 1993). Unit values have the advantage of providing a
measure of destination-speciﬁc prices for a large number of products.
Although the data are not at the individual good level, the issue of quality is also mitigated in
the data. The data include 10,741 products classiﬁed using the 10-digit Harmonized System product
codes, and so it is extremely disaggregated. (Appendix A provides the names of 30 randomly selected
goods from the dataset as an example of the level of detail.)
B. Pricing-to-Market Evidence
For exposition, consider a monopolist selling an identical good in diﬀerent markets (e.g., coun-
tries). Facing diﬀerent demand in each market, the ﬁr mw i l l ,i ng e n e r a l ,c h a r g ep r i c ep equal to a
market-varying markup μ over a common marginal cost c. Hence, while marginal costs and markups
6Converting to U.S. dollars using exchange rates produces nearly identical results, except that estimated elasticities of
prices are smaller with respect to exchange rate-based income per capita, given their larger variance. We also deﬂate all
price and income values to 1996 equivalents, though this is not strictly necessary as common price levels will be picked
up in the ﬁxed eﬀects introduced below.
7The free-alongside-ship value is the selling price or cost if not sold, including inland freight, insurance, and other
charges to the U.S. port of export, but excluding unconditional discounts and commissions. It is essentially the price
received by the exporting country before shipment.
6may vary across goods, i, and time, t, markups also vary across destination market, j:
lnpijt =l ncit + μijt.
The purpose is to examine whether μijt, the markup charged on good i at time t to destination
country j, is related to the level of income per capita or wages of that country. We estimate the
following regression equation:
(1) lnpijt = αit + β lnyjt + eijt,
in which yjt is a measure of destination country income (either GDP per capita, wage, or a vector of
both). The intercepts, αit, capture variation in lncit. They are estimated as ﬁxed eﬀects for each good-
year combination. We use the “within” estimator, so that the identiﬁcation of β comes from variation
in the income of destination countries within good-year cells.8 We report White robust standard errors
that allow for heteroskedasticity in eijt, and also allow for country-year clustering.9
Table 1 presents the estimated ˆ β coeﬃcients on log income and/or log wages from these ﬁxed-
eﬀect regressions. The “GDP per Capita Only” estimate, from a regression where log GDP per capita
is the only regressor (in addition to the ﬁxed eﬀects), yields an elasticity estimate of 17.0 on PPP
income/capita. The “Wage Only” estimates are slightly smaller at 16.2.
Though both sets of estimates are highly signiﬁcant, when we include log wages and log GDP
per capita together in the same regression, log wages wins the horse race hands down. These estimates
are presented in the two right-most columns. The estimated coeﬃcient on wages remains at nearly
the same level (15.6) and is highly signiﬁcant, while the GDP per capita coeﬃcient estimate becomes
much smaller (1.2) and insigniﬁcant.
Based on the estimates in Table 1, the magnitude of the price-wage relationship is potentially
large. In 2000, the diﬀerence in log wages between the richest and poorest countries in the data set
8Marginal costs are made both good- and year-speciﬁc to avoid problems with changing quality over time and issues
of non-stationarity in income and prices. Making marginal cost only good-speciﬁc while adding time-dummies common
to all goods produces very similar estimates, but suﬀers from the quality change and non-stationarity issues.
9Clustering on good-year has a negligible eﬀect on standard errors given the nearly 40,000 good-year combinations.
7(Germany and Sri Lanka, respectively) was 2.4 measured in PPP terms. Hence, the implied price
diﬀerences in U.S. exports to these countries would be 40 percent.
C. Alternatives to Pricing-to-Market
We interpret the price-income relationship we observe as pricing-to-market. We show here that
the evidence does not favor alternative explanations. The two alternatives we consider are that the
price diﬀerences we observe are driven by 1) diﬀerences in quality, or 2) related party trade and transfer
pricing concerns.10 The explanation of methodology and results here is heuristic, but details are given
in Appendix B.
Quality
Although the data are extremely disaggregated, one might still suspect that the positive rela-
tionships uncovered are driven by unobserved heterogeneity within product categories. That is, perhaps
there is no price discrimination, but wealthy countries simply tend to import higher quality (and higher
priced) goods within the 10-digit commodity categories. We address this result in two ways.
The ﬁrst approach is quite simple and involves dropping those product categories viewed as
potentially most heterogeneous. Panel B of Table 1 shows the results from running our regressions on
a sample in which we dropped any commodity with descriptions containing words like “other,”11 “not
elsewhere speciﬁed or included,” “NESOI,” and “parts.” The elasticity estimates are quite similar to
the full sample. For instance the "GDP per Capita Only” estimate fails very slightly from 17.0 to 16.5
and the “Wage Only” elasticity estimate falls from 16.2 to 15.0. We tried multiple approaches12 to
determine heterogeneous categories and they all yielded similar results.
Our second approach is to examine the biases stemming from heterogeneity directly, by ag-
gregating the data into even more heterogeneous product categories (9-, 7-, and 5-digit levels of the
10In addition to these two non-PTM explanations, we also considered a PTM alternative: whether pricing might be
driven by intellectual property protection and local competition from pirated goods. Our results were robust to inclusion
of indexes of intellectual property protection.
11We allow the phrase “other than” because it speciﬁes a higher level of detail.
12We also tried several variations of standards for determining “heterogeneous” goods (i.e., dropping goods based on
the detailed product description only, dropping goods based on the abridged production description only, and dropping
goods that lacked units) and dropping commodities whose price variation was deemed unrealistic. The results were very
robust to exclusion of these categories, and are available upon request.
8Harmonized System). Though the bias that comes from heterogeneity within 10-digit categories is still
unobservable, we can get an estimate of the quality bias at other levels by producing more aggregate
average prices. We do this by comparing the ˆ β estimates from regressions using these more aggregated
data to estimates using the less aggregated 10-digit coded data. A formal justiﬁcation of this approach,
based on a Lancasterian model where each Harmonized System digit represents a characteristic with a
given price, and an explicit statement of the potential quality bias are developed in Appendix B.
The results of this approach are presented in Table 2. Interpreting Table 2, in the 9-digit case, all
categories that are identical up to the ﬁrst nine digits are used together to construct 9-digit price data
according to equation (10). Only 878 commodities are unique up to all ten digits and these are combined
into 349 heterogenous 9-digit categories. As more digits are dropped, the categories become broader
and more heterogeneous, more goods are combined into groups, and more observations can be included
in the regressions. For example, at ﬁve digits artiﬁcial Christmas trees are simply artiﬁcial Christmas
trees, while at seven digits these are subdivided into plastic and non-plastic artiﬁcial Christmas trees,
one of which may have higher average prices and therefore be considered higher quality. (Appendix B
also shows how a random selection of categories are combined.)
For all of these aggregations, the estimates in Table 2 are systematically lower using the more
aggregated categories. We conclude that, in terms of observable characteristics, poorer countries import
higher quality (i.e., higher priced) goods from the U.S. on average. If the unobservables follow a similar
pattern, then our estimates would in fact be smaller than the true relationship.
This ﬁnding may appear surprising, and so it bears further explanation. First, the ﬁnding does
not imply that poor countries tend to consume higher quality goods on average than wealthy countries
do, only that they tend to import (from the U.S.) higher quality goods. Perhaps, this is a result
of high-income countries producing high-quality domestic substitutes for some goods, so they do not
always import the highest quality variety from the U.S. In contrast, poor countries may have only
low-quality domestic substitutes and therefore tend to import predominantly high-quality goods from
the U.S. That is, the U.S. may have a stronger comparative advantage in high-quality goods relative
9to poor countries than relative to other high-income countries.13 In any case, explaining the source of
this eﬀect is outside the scope of this paper, but our results are not likely driven by unobserved quality
biases.
Transfer Pricing of Related Party Trade
Approximately 30 percent of U.S. exports are between related parties.14 We explore whether
the pricing of these trade ﬂows inﬂuences our results. In theory, and legally, ﬁrms are supposed to use
market prices for intraﬁrm trade so that export prices on intraﬁrm and cross-ﬁrm transactions should
not systematically diﬀer, ceteris paribus. However, in practice, ﬁrms have reasons to price intraﬁrm
transactions diﬀerently than arm’s-length transactions. Such pricing allows multinationals to shift
proﬁts from high- to low-tax countries, and so we explore whether these considerations inﬂuence our
main ﬁnding.
To get at this idea, we collect data on corporate tax rates from the University of Michigan’s
World Tax Database.15 We also collect data on related party trade by country and 2-digit industry
from 1989 to 2000 from the BEA.16 We construct two measures of the importance of related party
trade. The ﬁrst is the fraction of exports to a country that is between related parties (i.e., exports to
related parties in country j/total exports to country j), and the second is the fraction of exports in an
industry that is between related parties (i.e., exports in industry i to related parties/total exports in
industry i).17
At 0.21, the unconditional correlation between log wages and corporate tax rates is not particu-
larly strong. Nevertheless, we examine whether prices are systematically higher when trade is to related
parties located in countries with high corporate tax rates. The exact regression equation and results are
13This comparative advantage interpretation of our result for U.S. exports is consistent with Schott’s (2004) result for
U.S. imports. Using similar data, Schott reported that U.S. imports coming from higher income countries tended to be
more expensive. In Schott’s study, there is good reason to believe these higher prices reﬂect higher quality. He examines
imported goods from producers in diﬀerent countries all imported into the same market. The variety of source countries
allows for more heterogeneity, while the single destination market precludes a pricing-to-market interpretation. Again,
if the U.S. has a stronger comparative advantage in high quality goods production relative to poor countries, then one




17The country measure of related party trade varies from year to year, while the industry speciﬁcd a t aa r ec o n s t a n t
over the sample and based on available 1998 data.
10given in Appendix B, but essentially, we do this by including the interaction between the intensity of
related party trade and the corporate tax rate as a right-hand-side variable (measuring whether related
party trade is priced substantially higher when sold to countries with high corporate tax rates). The
industry-speciﬁc measure of related party trade produces estimates of this interaction term that are
negligible and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The country-speciﬁc measure produces a signiﬁcant
estimate, but the magnitude is negligibly small and actually perverse. More important, using both
measures, the size of the price-wage elasticity does not fall with inclusion of these controls, but actually
rises slightly. Thus, transfer pricing does not appear to be driving the results.
D. Importance of Pricing-to-Market
Our ﬁrst aim was to estimate the importance of pricing-to-market for deviations from absolute
PPP. To do so, we modify Engel’s, now standard, decomposition of ﬂuctuations in real exchange over
time to take into account diﬀerences in price levels across countries by income,18
pi − ¯ p
yi − ¯ y
=
pT
i − ¯ pT









¯ pNT − ¯ pT¢
yi − ¯ y
,
⇒ εPPP = εLOP +( 1− α)εN/T, (2)
where εPPP is the elasticity of the overall price level (with respect to income per capita), εLOP is
the elasticity of deviations from the LOP (in tradables), εN/T is the elasticity of the relative price of
non-tradables, and α is the share of tradables. This decomposition shows that the aggregate price level
and income relationship we seek to explain, εPPP, depends one-for-one on the deviations from the LOP
and income relationship, εLOP, and only partly on how the relative price of non-tradables to tradables
varies with income across countries, εN/T.
The traditional HBS story assumes εLOP =0so that the 100 percent of deviations from PPP
come from the relative price of non-tradables to tradables. But the data tell us there are sizeable
deviations from the LOP. The PWT data on the price of tradables indicate that εLOP =0 .26,s ot h a t
18This assumes that the log price index is approximated by a geometric average p = αp
T +( 1− α)p
NT and that all
countries have the same basket.
11deviations from the LOP account for about 60 percent of the aggregate price-income relationship. The
more modest estimates of pricing-to-market from the export data of εLOP =0 .17 would still account
for 40 percent, a substantial share, of the PPP income relationship. These ﬁndings are consistent
with Engel’s ﬁnding that about 45 percent of U.S. long-run real exchange rate ﬂuctuations are due to
movements in the relative price of traded goods.19 We interpret the diﬀerence between the two values
for εLOP (0.26 and 0.17) as measuring the 20 percent contribution of local non-traded distribution costs
to diﬀerences in price levels across countries.
3. Search as a Theory of Pricing-to-Market
This section develops a search-driven theory of pricing-to-market, in which ﬁrms charge higher
prices on average in countries where wages, and hence the opportunity costs of search, are high.
Consumers in high-wage countries are less willing to spend time searching for lower prices. The theory
produces a positive relationship between prices, wages, and income. We ﬁrst discuss evidence in support
of such a theory and then present a formal model.
A. Corroborating Support for Search
There are a number of reasons to favor the search-based story over a direct preference story in
which consumers become less price sensitive with income. First, there is substantial evidence within
countries that prices are dispersed and that consumers alter their shopping behavior to take advantage
of this dispersion of prices. For instance, Aguiar and Hurst (2006), using scanner data on consumer
expenditures and diary data on time use, ﬁnd that a doubling of shopping time lowers the average
purchase price by 7 to 10 percent.20 Second, within countries there is evidence that shopping eﬀort,
measured as time spent shopping per dollar spent, is decreasing in the wage of shoppers. Third, cross
country evidence on time-use suggests that low-income countries have a comparative advantage in
producing non-traded search services. Fourth, empirically, the evidence from our U.S. export pricing-
to-market estimates are consistent with the search story. A ﬁnal methodological reason is that the search
19Engel (1999) attributes approximately 95 percent of short-run real exchange rate ﬂuctuations to movements in the
relative price of traded goods.
20Shopping with uncertainty, either due to the availability of the goods or time of the shopping trip, is isomorphic to a
model with no uncertainty over search time but uncertainty over prices.
12story oﬀers a true explanation of this relationship, rather than just assuming it through preferences.
Time-Use Evidence
Time-use studies provide evidence that time spent shopping is related to income in a way con-
sistent with the search model. Many studies have examined the relationship between the opportunity
cost of time and shopping behavior for consumers within a given economy, i.e., facing a given distri-
bution of prices. For example, McKenzie and Schargrodsky (2005) study the behavior of Argentinian
shoppers and ﬁnd a strong relationship in the cross-section of consumers between consumer search and
income. After controlling for quantity purchased, they ﬁnd that consumers in the 10th percentile of
t h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o ns p e n d3 0p e r c e n tm o r et i m e shopping than consumers in the 90th percentile.
Low-income consumers also visit a greater variety of stores. McKenzie and Schargrodsky also show
that the 2002 Argentine economic crisis, which lowered the wages of workers, led to increases in both
these measures of consumer search. Still, ﬁnancial crises presumably aﬀect both income/wealth and
the distribution of prices, in addition to the opportunity cost of time. Aguiar and Hurst (2006) have
cleaner evidence of the eﬀect of opportunity cost of time. They document an increase in shopping time
per purchase experienced upon retirement, which aﬀects the opportunity cost of time, but should not
aﬀect the lifetime budget constraint nor the distribution of prices. Both of these studies also ﬁnd that
search eﬀort is negatively related to purchase price. This evidence of dispersion in prices even within
countries provides further support for our search story over one based on tastes.
The cross-country time-use data are also consistent with our theory. Since the distribution of
prices is not the same over the cross-section of countries, the search story does not (necessarily) imply
that consumers in poor countries shop more per unit purchased than consumers in rich countries.
(Indeed, in the model, the response of ﬁrm pricing behavior exactly cancels out the increased willingness
to search in poor countries, and search time per unit is constant across countries. All diﬀerences in
search eﬀort work through the reservation price consumers are willing to accept.) However, our story
hinges on the cost of shopping rising with country income, which requires productivity in the production
technology to rise faster than the productivity in the shopping technology. Since income (and purchases)
rises faster than shopping productivity, a crucial implication of the theory is that people in rich countries
13spend more total hours shopping per hour ofw o r kt h a np e o p l ei np o o rc o u n t r i e s .
In Table 3 we report the relationship between time use and income per capita from two sep-
arate cross-country time-use datasets. The ﬁrst line reports the results from the recently completed
European Harmonized Time-Use Survey (EHTUS). The second line reports the results from the Multi-
national Time-Use Survey (MTUS). In general, cross-country time-use comparisons are diﬃcult owing
to deﬁnitional and sampling diﬀerences. The EHTUS was designed with these comparability issues in
mind, while the MTUS is a collection of mostly individual country surveys that have been recoded to
be more comparable ex-post. Despite these diﬀerences, we ﬁnd that both surveys generate a similar
relationship between the ratio of shopping to work time and income per capita. From the EHTUS we
ﬁnd a 10 percent increase in income per capita generates a 3.4 percent increase in the ratio of shopping
to work time (3.2 percent in the MTUS).
Export Pricing Evidence
Two pieces of evidence from the U.S. export data are consistent with the search explanation.
First, it is the wage level rather than income per capita that drives the pricing relationship, when
both explanatory variables are included. In the search story, the elasticity is driven by the opportunity
cost of time (i.e., the wage) rather than non-labor income or diﬀerences in income per capita arising
from demographic diﬀerences. Admittedly, it is possible that the signiﬁcance of wages could be driven
by other factors, such as measurement quality or coverage of the wage data (which is strictly the
manufacturing wage).
Second, pricing-to-market is stronger for goods in which search is likely to most important. We
measure the importance of search for a good in two dimensions. First, we show pricing-to-market is
strongest for consumer goods. After separating the data by their end-use category (1-digit codes),
consumer goods have the highest estimated income elasticity at 21.8. The other four categories (we
exclude re-exports and “other”) are all positive but lower than consumer goods, averaging just 14.9.21
The opportunity cost of search might also be a consideration to ﬁrms in their decisions to search, but
21Industrial supplies also have relatively high coeﬃcients (16.8 percent), while large products like capital goods (14.6
percent) and autos (11.3 percent), or products with presumably little market power like food/feeds/beverages (9.1 percent),
have smaller elasticities.
14we model consumer search, and the story applies most naturally to consumers. Finally, we also ﬁnd
that pricing-to-market is relatively stronger for goods sold in relatively more decentralized transactions.
To test the role of search frictions on trade ﬂows, Rauch (1999) classiﬁes goods into three methods
of sale:22 1) Organized exchange, 2) Reference priced and 3) Diﬀerentiated goods. The diﬀerentiated
category includes all goods not sold on organized exchanges or with reference prices. We should note
that the Rauch classiﬁcation is not absolute, in the sense that each category may include goods sold in
all three manners and so we can only say that the organized exchange category contains relatively more
goods sold on organized exchanges. Table 4 presents the estimates of pricing-to-market by a good’s
mode of sale. We ﬁnd the highest wage elasticity for diﬀerentiated goods of 16.0 percent and the lowest
for goods sold on organized exchanges of 8.0 percent.
B. Model
There are three imperfectly substitutable goods i = {1,2,3} and two countries denoted j =
{1,2}. Goods 1 and 2 are tradables, with good 1 produced exclusively in country 1 and good 2 produced
exclusively in country 2. Both countries can produce good 3, but it is not tradable. Including non-
tradables along with tradables allows us to incorporate, and distinguish between, the traditional HBS
eﬀect and pricing-to-market.
In each country, there are many stores, each specialized in the sale of a single good. For simplicity
we assume that the measure of each type of store in each country is the same. Households do not know
the price charged at any store and must physically visit a store to discover its price. Because search
takes time and is imprecise, stores have some monopoly power over consumers and thus may charge
diﬀerent prices for the same good.23 We assume stores are owned and operated by the ﬁrm producing
output, but require no additional inputs. We abstract from wholesale, retail, and international trade
costs since we found them to be only half as important as pricing-to-market for tradable prices.24
22The Rauch classiﬁcation is based strictly on the dominant method of sale for goods within a product category. It is
not based on the similarity of goods within a product category and therefore not a measure of quality diﬀerences within
product categories.
23In principle one could allow for more heterogeneity in the types of tradable goods produced in each country, but
this would complicate the analysis without changing our result: the price charged would still depend on consumers’
opportunity cost of search.
24In Appendix C we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a separate retail and distribution sector, where
15Households send out shoppers to search for the lowest price quotes and purchase goods. Each
shopper can buy at most one unit of the good. Shopping therefore takes time away from work and is
imperfect in the sense that consumers do not simultaneously receive price quotes from all the stores
in the market. We model search as noisy, as in Burdett and Judd (1983), so that a fraction q of
shoppers receive a single price quote while the remaining shoppers (1 − q) receive two price quotes.
The probability that a shopper receives a single price quote is random and equals q. After receiving
either one or two price quotes, the shopper must decide whether to purchase a single good at the lowest
price quote received or return home empty-handed.
Although without searching agents do not know the price charged at a speciﬁcs t o r e ,t h e yd o
know the distribution of prices in the economy. A shopper from country j looking for good i receives
(domestic) price quotes for good i from the known distribution Gij(.). Since the shopper can buy at
most one unit of the good, only the lowest price quote received by a shopper is relevant to the shopper’s
purchase decision. The distribution of lowest price quotes is then
Hij (p)=qGij (p)+( 1− q)
h




From the ﬁrm’s perspective, noisy search makes the consumers heterogeneous in that some
shoppers will have only one price quote, while others will have multiple price quotes. Consumers with
multiple price quotes will diﬀer in their second price quote. Since ﬁrms cannot distinguish between
these diﬀerent customers, the price they charge will inﬂuence both the proﬁt per sale and the share of
shoppers with multiple price quotes that purchase from them.
Consumer’s Problem
The consumer’s problem is similar to that in Alessandria (2004a). In each country, there are
many identical families. Lowercase variables denote individual decision rules and uppercase variables
denote aggregate decision rules. Each family is composed of a large number of agents, normalized to
a continuum of measure one. The problem of a family is to divide its agents between working and
consumers search among retailers rather than producers.
16shopping and to give shoppers instructions on which prices to accept. In country j the number of




nij + lj =1 ,
It is optimal to send each agent shopping for good i with a reservation price rule to purchase only if the
lowest price quote is below some reservation level, rij. Consumption of good i by country j consumers
depends on both the reservation price and the measure of shoppers. With many shoppers for each good
there is no uncertainty in consumption, which equals:
(4) cij = nijHij (rij).







which is clearly increasing in reservation price.
The representative home family chooses reservation prices and shoppers for each good to solve
the following problem:
Uj =m a x
{rij,cij}






i pij (rij)cij = wjlj + Πj,
equations (3), (4), (5),
where Uj is the utility function in country j and Πj is the proﬁts earned by country j ﬁrms.














,i =2 ,3, (7)
where U
j
i is the marginal utility of good i.
Equation (6) is an arbitrage condition that implies, at the margin, the family is indiﬀerent
between (1) increasing consumption by purchasing at the reservation price, or (2) sending out additional
shoppers — whose opportunity cost of search is measured in terms of the forgone wage — and purchasing
at the average price of the good in the market. With a reservation price of rij, the family expects to
send out 1/H (rij) shoppers to purchase a single unit. Since the reservation price is linked to the true
cost of the good, this is the cost that matters at the margin; therefore, the family chooses consumption
so that the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods equals the ratio of their reservation
prices as in equation (7).
We focus on the diﬀerence in prices across countries with diﬀerent incomes and therefore only
consider a representative agent in each country. However, it is straightforward to extend the model we
present to permit heterogeneity in wages. In this case, we see from equation (6) that within countries,
consumers with relatively high wages will have high reservation prices, and search less intensively, than
consumers with relatively low wages, consistent with the within-country evidence.
Firm’s Problem
There are many ﬁrms in each country that specialize in the production of either the country’s
tradable or non-tradable good. Firms within a country are ex ante identical. Labor is the only input
into production, and one unit of labor in country j produces aT
j units of the tradable good (good j)
and aNT
j units of the non-tradable good (good 3). To focus on international price discrimination, ﬁrms
can costlessly sell their goods in either country through the pre-established outlets.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the problem of a representative ﬁrm in country 1 selling the tradable
good (good 1)i nc o u n t r yj. A similar problem exists for non-tradable and country 2 ﬁrms. Even
18though many ﬁrms produce the same good, the search frictions give each ﬁrm some monopoly power
and lead ﬁrms to behave as monopolistic competitors.25 Each ﬁrm takes as given the distribution of
prices charged by other ﬁrms selling the same good, G1j, the number of price quotes that it delivers, the
reservation price of consumers, R1j, and the unit cost of production, w1/aT
1 . Given the constant returns
to scale production, the amount of sales does not inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s unit cost. Thus, the ﬁrm’s problem
becomes one of maximizing proﬁts per customer that receives a price quote. The representative ﬁrm


















2−q [1 − G1j (p)] for p≤R1j,
0 otherwise.
As long as the ﬁrm’s price is below the reservation price, the ﬁrm will sell to all customers with one
price quote. By increasing its price, the ﬁrm increases its revenue per sale but decreases the likelihood
of a sale, since it increases the probability that those customers with two price quotes have a second
price quote that is lower than the ﬁrm’s price.
Burdett and Judd (1983) show that given a reservation price, Rij, and cost of production,wi/aT
i ,
a unique distribution of prices exists,Gij (p), where
Gij (p)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨



















Any price on the support of the distribution yields ﬁrms the same proﬁts, and ﬁrms will randomize.
Firms with relatively high prices primarily sell to those consumers with a single price quote, while
25Our model is similar in spirit to the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model. The main diﬀerence
is that here the elasticity of substitution between varieties depends endogenously on the search structure.
19those with relatively low prices attract more of those shoppers with multiple price quotes.
Equilibrium
The total demand for labor by ﬁrms producing tradables and non-tradables in country j are LT
j
and LNT












A symmetric equilibrium is then a distribution of prices, Gij, and wages, wj;c o n s u m e rd e c i s i o n
rules {lj,n ij,r ij} and aggregate decision rules {Lj,N ij,R ij} in each country j = {1,2} for each good i =
{1,2,3} such that: (1) Given prices, wages, and proﬁts, consumer’s decision rules solve the household’s
problem in each country; (2) Given prices and wages, each ﬁrm chooses a price to solve each ﬁrm’s
problem; (3) Goods and labor markets clear; and (4) Individual and aggregate decisions are consistent
so that all households from the same country behave identically.
Alessandria (2004a) shows that the highest price in the market equals the reservation price. This
upper bound on prices is an equilibrium because the highest-priced ﬁrms have no incentive to charge a
price above the reservation price, as they would lose all sales.26 As no shopper returns empty-handed,
the marginal cost of each good in each country is the average price paid for it plus the opportunity
cost of the shopper. This equals the reservation price:
rij = wj + pij (rij).
We focus only on the average transacted price (which equals the unit value), since this most
closely corresponds to the measure used by the national statistical agencies and in our empirical work.
By substituting the equilibrium reservation price into the distribution of prices, we can solve for the
26This would not necessarily be true if consumers from both countries could search in the same market. Some ﬁrms
would choose to sell only to those consumers from the country with the high reservation price.

















The average price for good i paid by a consumer in country j is equal to a markup over the marginal
cost of the ﬁrm from country i. The markup depends on both the information structure of search
(summarized by q)a n dt h et i m ec o s to fs e a r c hwj. Holding q c o n s t a n t ,a g e n t si nac o u n t r yw i t ha
low wage will, on average, pay a lower price than agents in a country with a relatively high wage.
Consequently, the model predicts a strong relationship between prices and local wages.27
4. Results
This section evaluates the explanatory power of the model. We ﬁrst show that the model
generates large deviations from the LOP even when productivity diﬀerences across countries are the
same in tradables and non-tradables. Moreover, we ﬁnd that our model closely matches the observed
relationship between wages and tradable prices. We then examine the importance of pricing-to-market
relative to the traditional HBS eﬀect arising from productivity diﬀerences that are biased toward
tradables.
Given a relative productivity of tradables vs. income relationship that matches the U.S. time
series evidence, we ﬁnd that the model explains 57 percent of the price-income relationship in the data.
Moreover, pricing-to-market accounts for 25 percent of the price-income eﬀect and the HBS channel
accounts for 32 percent.
27Equation (8) also points out the diﬀerence between our model and the HBS model. In both models, tradables may sell
for diﬀerent prices across countries. In HBS, the price of tradables may diﬀer internationally when there is a non-traded
input, such as wholesale or retail distribution, to get the good to the ﬁnal consumer. In our model of pricing-to-market,
t h es e a r c hc o s ti ss i m i l a rt ot h en o n - t r a d e dr e t a i lo rd i s t r i b u t i o nc o s t si nH B S .U n l i k ei nH B S ,t h i ss e a r c hc o s ti sb o r n e
by the consumer and through the search frictions it is incorporated into the price charged at the border.
21A. Calibration
Preferences are consistent with the standard textbook presentation of the HBS model (see Ob-
stfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996). Agents in each country have the following symmetric utility function:










Preferences over tradables and non-tradables are Cobb-Douglas.28 Home and foreign tradables are
often assumed to be perfect substitutes. We depart slightly from this case and set ρ =0 .99.29
The size of the tradable sector is set to match the median trade share of GDP of those OECD
countries for which re-exports are not large30 and for which we have manufacturing wage data from the
BLS. The median country31 imports and exports approximately one-third of GDP in 2000 and so we
set α =2 /3 and non-tradables account for one-third of output.32 The openness of a country aﬀects the
weight we put on the HBS channel but does not substantially change the amount of pricing-to-market.
We report sensitivity to the trade share.
The production side of the economy is calibrated as a symmetric two-country model to match
certain features of the U.S. economy. The production parameters are the search, q, and market goods,
aT, productivities. For our baseline case, we assume that tradable and non-tradable technologies are
identical,33 so that aT
j = aNT
j =¯ a. Since productivity in market shopping is 1 (each shopper can pur-
chase one unit), ¯ a captures the relative productivity of market production to shopping. In equilibrium,
since all produced goods are purchased: ¯ a = N
L, the ratio of shopping time to market labor. The
American Time-Use Study (2003) reports that the average American spends about 4 times as much
28The assumption of a unitary elasticity of substition between tradables and non-tradables is consistent with the estimate
of 1.24 by Ostry and Reinhart (1991) for a group of developing countries and Mendoza’s (1995) estimate of 0.74 for a
group of industrialized countries.
29Since our focus is on the long-run diﬀerences in price levels, our calibration of ρ diﬀers substantially from models
focused on short-run ﬂuctuations.
30This requires dropping the Netherlands, Belgium, and Ireland.
31For comparison, the median country in the Penn World Tables imported approximately 38 percent of GDP and
exported 42 percent of GDP in 2000.
32Stockman and Tesar (1995) use data on a cross-section of OECD countries from 1970 to 1985 and ﬁnd the tradable
sector is nearly 50 percent of output.
33The model is calibrated to the typical good. A more general model would allow for goods to vary in both the noisy
search parameter and the time it takes per purchase, while holding these parameters constant across countries.
22time working as purchasing goods and services, so ¯ a =1 /4. The labor’s share parameter34 θ is set
to 60 percent of total income (Cooley and Prescott 1996), and this pins down q =0 .727.I n a l l o f
our experiments, we hold this noisy search parameter constant across countries but allow tradable and
non-tradable productivity to vary.35
We use the model to construct a distribution of prices and income, which we then compare to the
data. We do this by solving our two-country model repeatedly. In each case, one country is the U.S.,
and the second country is a PWT benchmark country. Productivity in the second country is chosen to
match income per capita relative to the U.S. In this way, we match the world income distribution and
have synthetic price data for 115 artiﬁcial economies.
With two symmetric countries, our calibration implies an average markup over marginal cost of
66 percent. However, because exporters reduce their markup to low-income countries, in the asymmetric
version of the model, the average markup of ﬁrms from the richest country is only 60 percent, and
40 percent on average across the 115 countries. Markups are notoriously diﬃcult to measure, yet this
level of monopoly power is consistent with those found in structural IO studies of the ready-to-eat
cereals market (Nevo 2001), the U.S. minivan market and U.S. automobile market (Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes, 1995, and Goldberg, 1995). Moreover, our pricing-to-market evidence ﬁnds on average there
is a 40 percent price diﬀerence for the same goods between the richest and poorest countries. Such
price variation is only possible if markups are of this size.
We start by assuming that the productivity gap between countries is the same in both sectors.
This is our Balanced Productivity gap case. Next, we solve the model assuming that the productivity
diﬀerence in the non-tradable sector is smaller than in the tradable sector. This is our benchmark
model, the Biased Productivity gap case. While it is commonly asserted that the productivity gap in
tradables is relatively large compared to non-tradables, there is little direct cross-country evidence of
this gap. Studies that do measure this gap across countries assume that the LOP holds for traded
34From the market clearing and income constraint q =
(1−θ)
θ¯ a+(1−θ), where θ is labor’s share of income. Since q>0 is the
source of market power, it helps determine (1 − θ), the share of income that goes to proﬁts. In a more general model with
capital, this would equal the share of income that covers ﬁxed costs.
35T h ec h o i c eo fq will determine the markup and will inﬂuence the slope of the price-income relation across countries.
However, q is calibrated independently of its implications for the slope.
23goods and use relative prices to infer productivity diﬀerences.36
Rather than use our theory to construct relative productivity diﬀerences, we consider the evi-
dence on the relationship between income and productivity in tradables and non-tradables, respectively,
in the U.S. time series. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) estimate labor productivity growth by industry
for the U.S. from 1958 to 1996. We classify these industries into tradable and non-tradable sectors and
then construct a measure of the productivity gap using each industry’s share of sectoral value-added.
These weighted averages, along with simple averages, of TFP and labor productivity growth rates37 are
reported in Table 5. We ﬁnd that non-tradable labor productivity has grown about two-thirds as fast
as tradable labor productivity. In the biased productivity case, we take the time-series evidence from
the U.S. on the productivity gap and examine the implications of such a gap for the world distribution
of income and prices. We also test the sensitivity to the relative size of this gap. For reference, we
also present results from the standard HBS model with no pricing-to-market.38 The parameters for
the various models are reported in Table 6.
Prices and income are measured consistently with the empirical data and statistics computed
in Section 2. Deviations from the LOP are measured as the log average price of U.S. exports to
destination j,o rlnLOPj =l n ( PUS,j/PUS,US). To measure income, we follow the convention of the
Penn World Tables and compute nominal GDP, Yj, as the sum of expenditures of domestic production.
The aggregate price level, Pj, is measured using the welfare-based price index.39 Real income, yj,i s
nominal GDP deﬂated by the price index Pj (i.e., yj = Yj/Pj).
With these measures of real income and prices, we estimate statistics that correspond to our
empirical results.40 All results are presented in Table 7. The table’s top panel presents our elasticity
36For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) use the relative price of consumption to investment to infer that productivity
in the investment sector increases with output (in the cross-section) at a rate 2.6 times that of the consumption sector.
Similarly, using data on relative price levels, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2006) ﬁnd that the productivity diﬀerence in
tradables must be nearly 12 times larger than those in non-tradables.
37We follow Canzoneri et al. (1999) and focus on labor productivity. What really matters for the HBS eﬀect is the
change in the marginal product of labor across sectors. For a broad range of production functions this is proportional to
the change in average labor productivity. In contrast, measuring TFP growth depends on the assumed structure of the
production function and requires measures of capital stocks and materials usage.
38Our model converges to the HBS model as q → 0 and a becomes large.
39The price index takes into account only the transaction price of the goods, not the search costs that are borne.
Deriving price indices that include the costs of search do not noticeably change the quantitative results. Also, measuring
output at world prices generates similar results.
40We compute a single price for each country and then estimate our statistics from the synthetic sample of countries
24estimates from various versions of the model. The bottom panel decomposes each model’s price-
income relation into its main components. The column titled Data summarizes our estimates of the
price-income relationship from the PWT tables (εPPP and εN/T)a n dt h eU . S .e x p o r td a t a( εLOP and





B. Balanced Technology Gap





j . These cross-country productivity diﬀerences generate diﬀerences in wages, income
and prices. In equilibrium, this generates higher prices for all goods, tradable and non-tradable, in
higher wage/income countries. With tradables accounting for two-thirds of expenditures, the model
generates quantitatively important elasticities of deviations from the LOP (11.4) and violations of
absolute PPP (10.7). Thus, our model can account for 67 percent of the deviations from the LOP and
almost 25 percent of the violations of PPP associated with income levels.41 Moreover, the elasticity of
deviations from the LOP with respect to wages in the model is only slightly less than in the data (11.5
vs. 16.2).
C. Biased Technology Gap
The column titled Benchmark in Table 7 reports the properties of the model when the rela-
tive productivity of the tradable sector rises with income as in the Jorgensen-Stiroh data. With a
biased productivity gap across countries, the model accounts for 57 percent of the violations of PPP
with income. The traditional HBS eﬀect accounts for 32 percent of the price-income relationship,
while pricing-to-market accounts for 25 percent. Pricing-to-market is quite similar to the balanced
running the same regressions we ran in the empirical section.
41The diﬀerence between εLOP and εPPP i sd u et oas m a l lt e r m so ft r a d ee ﬀect since tradables are close, but not,
perfect substitutes. The low supply of goods from a poor country moves the terms of trade in its favor, which then
implies wage diﬀerences are smaller than productivity diﬀerences, and therefore the higher income country has a lower
production cost. The absolute level of markups is based on local shopping costs and therefore ﬁx e dw i t h i na n ym a r k e t
(recall equation (8)) which means that lower cost producers charge higher proportional markups. With higher markups,
ﬁrms from rich countries have more room to lower their export price and hence do more pricing-to-market. To match the
export data, we measure εLOP export prices from the higher income country. The terms of trade also aﬀect the relative
price of non-traded to traded goods. The price of non-tradables will actually fall with income, since they are locally
produced and production costs are lower in richer countries.
25productivity case.42
For comparison, in the column titled HBS standard model, the HBS model generates only 28
percent of the price-income relationship. Thus, given the observed productivity bias in the time-series
data, the HBS model alone explains little of the PPP-income relationship. Our benchmark pricing-to-
market model exhibits a slightly stronger HBS eﬀect because it generates larger wage diﬀerences than
income diﬀerence across countries. This occurs because higher market productivity raises consumption,
which leads to more shopping time and less market labor. As income rises, the ratio of shopping to
work time rises faster in our model than the point estimate in the data (0.968 vs. 0.330). Both models
generate movements in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods with income that are only
slightly higher than the data.
D. Sensitivity
We now consider a few modiﬁcations of the model. In particular, we consider the role of the
share of tradables, productivity bias, labor share of income, and shopping technology for our results.43
Except where noted, the model is parameterized as in the benchmark case of the biased productivity
gap.
Share of Tradables
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the share of tradables and both pricing-to-market and
violations of PPP with balanced productivity. The eﬀect of varying the share of tradables is minor.
This is because pricing-to-market aﬀects all goods, traded and non-traded, in the same way. Thus, the
tradables share only aﬀects pricing-to-market through its inﬂuence on the terms of trade and in turn
42Compared to the balanced productivity case, now there is slightly less pricing-to-market, with a larger decline in
εw.T h e l o w e r c o e ﬃcients are a combination of economic forces and our statistical methods. With biased productivity
diﬀerences, cross-country wage diﬀerences exceed income diﬀerences, and so the price diﬀerences between the richest
and poorest countries are larger than with the balanced productivity case. This increases the estimate of εLOP, holding
pricing-to-market on wages constant. But pricing-to-market on wages actually declines because for the poorest countries,
which have lower wages than in the balanced case, ﬁrms are already charging close to marginal cost and can go no lower.
That pricing-to-market with respect to wages tends to ﬂatten out for low-wage/income countries implies that the model
is non-linear and with our linear estimatation this shows up as a lower coeﬃcient on εLOP.
43We also explored varying the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables as well as the elasticity
of substitution across tradables. Varying these elasticities primarily aﬀected estimates of εN/T, but had very little impact
on εLOP or εw. We also explored changing the level of shopping time per purchase equally across countries and this had
a very minor impact on our estimates.
26the relative wage. However, with highly substitutable goods this eﬀect is small.
When the productivity gap is biased, the tradables share has a large eﬀect on the size of violations
from PPP. With a smaller share of tradables, non-traded goods receive a larger weight in prices. In
Table 7, the column titled Low Trade reports the results of the benchmark model with a trade share
of 29.5 percent. This is the necessary tradables share for the benchmark model to generate the same
violations from PPP as in the data. This lower share of tradables slightly weakens the amount of
pricing-to-market in the model.
For comparison, we also include the size of violations from PPP in the standard model with
a low tradables share of α =0 .108 in the column titled HBS Low Trade. This is the level of trade
consistent with the aggregate price-income relationship in the standard HBS model. This tradables
share generates trade ﬂows that are only 15 percent of those in the data and requires larger diﬀerences
in the relative price of tradables to non-tradables than in the PWT data (0.48 vs. 0.35).
Biased Productivity
Figure 4 plots our measures of elasticities against the extent of comparative advantage in non-
tradables (i.e., the ratio of relative non-tradable productivities to relative tradable productivities),












. When gN/T =0 , technological diﬀerences are
completely concentrated in the tradables sector. When gN/T =1 , there is no relative bias across sectors
in technology levels. For comparison, the elasticity of deviations from PPP in a model without price
discrimination is also reported as εPPP_STD.
From Figure 4 we see that the violations from PPP are decreasing in gN/T, while pricing-to-
market is increasing in gN/T. To understand these diﬀerent results, ﬁrst note that in the model without
price discrimination, εPPP_STD is decreasing in gN/T because the relative price of non-tradables is
decreasing as the productivity gap diminishes.
Two factors inﬂuence the relationship between pricing-to-market and the productivity gap.
First, ﬁrms face a lower bound on price in their pricing-to-market decision, since they will never
charge below marginal cost. Thus, pricing-to-market is somewhat non-linear. Among relatively high-
wage countries, ﬁrms will vary prices with their customers’ wages, but among relatively low-wage
27destinations, markups are already quite low, so ﬁrms have very little ability to vary their price with
the destination wage. Second, with a biased productivity gap, relative wage diﬀerences are much
larger than relative income diﬀerences. This is because relative wages are determined primarily by
the productivity diﬀerence in tradables, while relative income diﬀerences are based on productivity in
both sectors. Taken together, these two features imply that a biased productivity gap leads to greater
pricing-to-market among high-income locations and lower pricing-to-market among low-income loca-
tions. Given the world distribution of income, the reduced pricing-to-market to low-income locations
has a stronger eﬀect on the estimate of pricing-to-market.
From Figure 4, we see that for the model without pricing-to-market to account for the violations
from PPP, the productivity gap in tradables must be ten times the productivity gap in non-tradables,
or about 6.6 times larger than in the U.S. time series data.
Labor Share
We now consider the eﬀect of the labor share on the model’s predictions. In Table 7, the column
titled Low Labor reports the results of the model with a labor share of 50 percent. In this case, there
are larger violations of PPP and these are entirely due to an increase in pricing-to-market. The lower
labor share leads to larger markups and gives ﬁr m sm o r er o o mt op r i c e - t o - m a r k e t .T h i si sp a r t i c u l a r l y
important for pricing to low-income countries since ﬁrms will never price below marginal cost. With
higher markups, the model now accounts for 86 percent of the tradable price-income relationship and
93 percent of the tradable price-wage relationship.
Search Time
Our model relies on relative productivity diﬀerences in shopping to be smaller than in market
production. As we have seen already, there is some evidence of this from the time-use surveys, but not
to the extent we have assumed in the model. To make the model consistent with the time-use data, we
now allow the amount purchased per shopping trip to vary across countries with tradable productivity.
We assume consumers in country j can purchase κj units per shopping trip, and let diﬀerences in κj
28be proportional to the diﬀerences in the tradable technology.44 To match the elasticity of shopping to
work time, the model requires the productivity gap in shopping to be 53 percent of the productivity
gap in tradables, so that lower income countries continue to have a comparative advantage in shopping.
The column titled Variable Shopping reports the results of this modiﬁcation. The estimates
are quite similar to the benchmark model for two reasons. First, because there is less substitution of
work for shopping, the model can match the income distribution with smaller wage diﬀerences. This
tends to weaken the HBS eﬀect. Second, the increased shopping time of lower income countries means
that diﬀerences in search costs are smaller for a given diﬀerence in wages compared to the benchmark
model. This leads ﬁrms to do less pricing-to-market among richer countries, but also allows them
to do more pricing-to-market among poorer countries.45 The net eﬀect is a higher estimate of εLOP
that counteracts the lower HBS eﬀect, leading to a very small change in the aggregate price-income
relationship.
E. Relative Prices and Relative Wages
Pricing-to-market in the model is driven by the opportunity cost of time measured by wages
and not income per capita. As the model abstracts from important determinants of income per capita
such as population growth, labor market participation and capital accumulation, focusing on relative
wages and prices is a more direct test of the model. Rather than match the distribution of income per
capita, we recalibrate technology to match the exact distribution of wages in the sample of countries
for which we have wage data. Figure 5 plots the relationship between relative price levels and wages
from the model and the data.
The data generate an elasticity of price levels with respect to wages, which we denote εPPP
w equal
to 0.4. The model generates εPPP
w =0 .30 and thus can explain nearly 75 percent of the relationship
between prices and wages. We ﬁnd that pricing-to-market is the largest source of the price-wage
relationship, since it accounts for 50 percent and the HBS eﬀect accounts for 25 percent. The stronger
44As before, we normalize the units per purchase in our base country to be κ =1 .
45This result may seem perverse but is largely due to estimating a linear model on non-linear data. If we plotted the
distribution of prices against income in the benchmark model and the variable shopping model, we would ﬁnd that for
each income level the variable search model generates higher prices. However, the variable search model generates an
almost linear relationship between income and prices, while the benchmark model generates a non-linear relationship.
29pricing-to-market relationship that we ﬁnd with wages is consistent with our empirical result, in which
wages seem to drive the pricing-to-market.46
5. Conclusions
Using highly disaggregated data on U.S. exports at the border, we ﬁnd strong empirical evidence
that pricing-to-market accounts for most of the long-run diﬀerences in tradable prices across countries.
These tradable price diﬀerences are an important source of the deviations from absolute PPP, account-
ing for about 40 percent of the relation between aggregate price levels and income per capita in the
data. This is in stark contrast to the conventional view that deviations from absolute PPP are solely
due to diﬀerences in non-traded goods prices.
Our empirical work suggests that consumers in low-income countries are more price sensitive
than consumers in high-income countries. We develop a model with this type of pricing-to-market
based on international productivity diﬀerences and search frictions. Similar to HBS, our model relies
on low-income countries having a comparative advantage in producing non-traded goods. Unlike HBS,
these non-traded goods are shopping activities that aﬀect the prices of all goods purchased. Our model
generates a role for local wages in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms and is consistent with cross-
country diﬀerences in shopping activities. The model is also consistent with two features of our data
analysis suggesting an important role for search frictions. First, contrary to previous work, we ﬁnd
that wages have substantially more explanatory power for pricing-to-market than income per capita.
Second, pricing-to-market appears strongest for those goods for which search frictions are likely to
be most important, consumer goods and goods sold in decentralized transactions. This evidence is
also consistent with the within-country evidence that consumers can use search to lower their average
purchase price.
Naturally, other factors may contribute to the pricing relation we have found, so further empirical
work on this topic is necessary. Nevertheless, ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst investigation
to document an important role empirically and theoretically for tradable prices and absolute PPP. It
46Of course, it is also true that since wages are our main focus, this may be due to our rather simplistic modeling of
income, which ignored leisure decisions, capital income, etc.
30is typically assumed in theoretical and empirical work that the law of one price holds for tradables. We
have shown that such an assumption may drastically overstate the diﬀerences in productivity across
sectors across countries and is important for understanding the source of income diﬀerences as well.
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331 BARS & RODS OF IRON OR NONALLOY STEEL, HOT-ROLLED, IN IRREGULARLY WOUND COILS, OF 
CIRCULAR CROSS-SECTION LT 14MM DIAMETER, CONTAINING LT 0.6% CARBON
2 BOVINE LEATHER WITHOUT HAIR ON, PRETANNED EXCEPT VEGETABLE PRETANNED, BUT NOT 
FURTHER PREPARED
3 BOVINE UPPER LEATHER, WHOLE, WITHOUT HAIR ON, OF A UNIT SURFACE AREA NOT EXCEEDING 28 
SQUARE FEET (2.6 M2)
4 CHICKEN CUTS AND EDIBLE OFFAL (EXCEPT LIVERS) FROZEN
5 COPPER POWDERS OF LAMELLAR STRUCTURE; FLAKES
6 DIAMONDS, UNSORTED
7 DIISODECYL ORTHOPHTHALATES
8 ELECTRICAL SPECTROMETERS AND SPECTROGRAPHS USING OPTICAL RADIATIONS (ULTRAVIOLET, 
VISIBLE, INFRARED)
9 FERROCHROMIUM, 4 PERCENT OR LESS CARBON
10 GRINDERS, POLISHERS AND SANDERS, SUITABLE FOR METAL WORKING, ROTARY TYPE (INC 
COMBINED ROTARY-PERCUSSION) PNEUMATIC TOOLS FOR WORKING IN THE HAND
11 HOMOGENIZED COMPOSITE FOOD PREPARATIONS (SEE NOTE 3)
12 KRAFT FOLDING CARTON STOCK, CLAY COATED, BLEACHED AND OVER 95% CHEMICAL FIBERS, 
WEIGHING 150 G/M2 OR LESS, IN ROLLS OR SHEETS
13 METHYLCHLOROFORM (1,1,1-TRICHLOROETHANE)
14 MONOLITHIC I/C'S, DIGITAL, SILICON, (MOS), FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR, VOLATILE MEMORY, 
DYNAMIC READ-WRITE RANDOM ACCESS (DRAM) NOT OVER 300,000 BITS
15 OPTICAL SCANNERS AND MAGNETIC INK RECOGNITION DEVICES, ENTERED WITH THE REST OF A 
SYSTEM
16 ORIGINAL ENGRAVINGS, PRINTS AND LITHOGRAPHS, FRAMED OR NOT FRAMED
17 PAVERS, FINISHERS AND SPREADERS FOR CONCRETE, FOR PUBLIC WORKS, BUILDING OR SIMILAR USE
18 POCKET LIGHTERS, GAS FUELED, REFILLABLE
19 POLYMERS OF VINYL ACETATE, IN AQUEOUS DISPERSION
20 POWER SUPPLIES FOR ADP, SUITABLE FOR PHYSICAL INCORPORATION INTO AUTOMATIC DATA 
PROCESSING MACHINES,WITH A POWER OUTPUT NOT EXCEEDING 50W
21 SKINS OF SWINE, EXCEPT LIVERS, EDIBLE, FROZEN
22 SOBUTENE-ISOPRENE (BUTYL) RUBBER (IIR)
23 SWEET CORN, UNCOOKED OR COOKED BY STEAMING OR BOILING IN WATER, FROZEN
24 SWITCHES, PUSH-BUTTON, RATED AT NOT OVER 5 A, FOR A VOLTAGE NOT EXCEEDING 1,000 V
25 SYNTHETIC FILAMENT YARN EXCEPT SEWING THREAD, NOT FOR RETAIL SALE, SINGLE 
MONO,MULTIFILAMENT, OF POLYESTER UNTWISTED OR WITH A TWIST OF LT 5 TURNS/MTR
26 SYNTHETIC FILAMENT YARN EXCEPT SEWING THREAD, NOT FOR RETAIL SALE, SINGLE, 
MULTIFILAMENT, WITH A TWIST OF GE 5 TURNS PER M OF POLYETHYLENE, PROPYLENE
27 TABLE OR KITCHEN GLASSWARE OTHER THAN DRINKING GLASSES, OF LEAD CRYSTAL
28 TILTING ARBOR TABLE SAWS, WOODWORKING, NEW
29 TURNIP SEED OF A KIND USED FOR SOWING
30 WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING LT 85% BY WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING GT 200G/M2 
DYED PLAIN WEAVE POPLIN OR BROADCLOTH MIXED WITH MMF
Appendix A: 
Sample of 30 Randomly Selected Goods in Alphabetical OrderAppendix B - Details of Quality and Related Party Trade Analysis
Quality
To formalize the quality argument, assume without loss of generality that goods can be classiﬁed
individually using an N +1digit classiﬁcation scheme, but only average prices at an N-digit level
classiﬁcation are observed. We model prices as depending on characteristics in a Lancasterian sense,
where each level of aggregation (e.g. 1...N digit) involves a certain set of common characteristics.
Ideally, we would estimate β from a relationship based on completely disaggregated (i.e., (N+1)-




n=1 αn,ij + β lnYk + εijk
where i indicates a product group,jindicates the individual good within the product group, and k
indexes the destination country.
Assume instead, however, that the unit values for group i (going to country k) we observe are
















j qijkα(N+1),ij + β lnYk +
X
j εijk
Given the i-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, we can rewrite this equation in deviation form using ˆ Xik
notation to represent the deviations of Xik from mean values Xi for group i:
ln ˆ PN
ik = β ln ˆ Yik +
X
j qijkˆ α(N+1),ij + uik
The quality argument claims that cov
hP
qijˆ α(N+1),ij,ln ˆ Yik
i
> 0, since:
ˆ β → β +
cov(
P
j qijˆ α(N+1),ij,ln ˆ Y )
var(ln ˆ Y )
Interpreting the expression, ˆ α(N+1),ij is the quality of an individual good j relative to the average
in the product category i.S i n c eqijk is the fraction of product group i purchases in country k that are
on good j, the weighted average
P
j qijkˆ α(N+1),ij is the average relative quality purchased by country
k. Thus, if countries with relatively high incomes, ln ˆ Yik, tend to purchase relatively high-quality goods
on average, then this covariance bias will make ˆ β positive even if β =0 . In practice, our estimates of
ˆ β decrease with aggregation, as shown in Table 2, indicating that the quality bias is negative. Low
-income countries tend to purchase relatively high-quality goods. The table below gives an example of
the aggregation of categories in practice.
47The analysis is much easier to express using geometric averages instead of arithmetic averages. Regressions analogous
to those in Table 2 but using arithmetic averages have the nice interpretation of answering “What would the regressions
look like if the data were truly less disaggregate?”, however, and produce the same qualitative (and similar quantitative)
conclusions.
35Related Party Trade and Transfer Pricing
We ran regressions using the interaction between the intensity of related party trade and the
corporate tax rate as a right-hand-side variable. If corporate tax rates in the destination country are
high (relative to the U.S.), then prices should also be high in order to lower proﬁts earned in the
destination country. But this eﬀect should be stronger, the more important related party trade is. The
transfer pricing argument predicts that the coeﬃcient on this variable should be positive. Finally, if
transfer pricing is driving the results, then inclusion of this variable ought to dramatically reduce our
pricing-to-market estimates.
Using the industry-speciﬁc related party trade measure RPTi as an example, the regression
equation is:
lnpijt =˜ αit + ˜ β lnyijt + γ(τj,t − τUS,t)+δ(τj,t − τUS,t)RPTi +˜ eijt
=[ ˜ αit − γτUS,t]+˜ β lnyijt + γτj,t − δτUS,tRPTi + δτj,tRPTi +˜ eijt
The tildas distinguish the ﬁxed eﬀect and income parameters from those in the simpler regression
equation (1). The ﬁxed eﬀect now captures both ˜ αit and the γτUS,t, which is independent of the
destination market. The third term captures the broad eﬀect of the corporate tax rate in the destination
market, while time dummies interacted with related party trade capture the fourth term without
identifying δ.T h e δ coeﬃcient is instead identiﬁed by the interaction of corporate tax rates and
related party trade, and the theory would predict δ>0. When we control for related party trade by
country, the RPTi is replaced by the country-speciﬁcm e a s u r eRPTj. The available sample changes
slightly based on whether we use RPTi (industry-speciﬁc) or RPTj (country-speciﬁc). We keep the
samples constant, however, when comparing the results that include the controls to the results that
exclude them.
The industry-speciﬁc measure of related party trade produces estimates of ˆ δ that are negligible
and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The country-speciﬁc measure produces an estimate of −0.008
and is signiﬁcant, but the magnitude is small and actually perverse. More important, using both
measures, the size of the price-wage elasticity does not fall with inclusion of these controls, but actually
rises slightly. After controlling with the industry-speciﬁcm e a s u r eo fRPT, ˜ β increases from 0.179 to
0.193 for wages and 0.174 to 0.184 for real income per capita. Using the country-speciﬁcm e a s u r e
requires using a slightly diﬀerent sample because of data availability. Inclusion of this control increases
˜ β from 0.175 to 0.207 for wages and 0.194 to 0.249 for real income per capita. Thus, transfer pricing









2601110030 A A A IRON ORE NONAGGLOMERATED CONCENTRATES
2601110060 B A A IRON ORE NONAGGLOMERATED COARSE
2601110090 C A A IRON ORE NONAGGLOMERATED NOT COARSE
2601120030 D B A IRON ORE AGGLOMERATED PELLETS
2601120060 E B A IRON ORE AGGLOMERATED BRIQUETTES
2601120090 F B A IRON ORE AGGLOMERATED NOT PELLETS OR BRIQUETTES
7204410020 G C B NO 1 BUNDLES STEEL SCRAP
7204410040 H C B NO 2 BUNDLES STEEL SCRAP
7204410060 I C B BORINGS, SHOVELINGS AND TURNINGS STEEL SCRAP
7204410080 J C B
SHAVINGS, CHIPS, MILLING WASTE, SAWDUST, FILINGS, 
TRIMMINGS, STAMPINGS STEEL SCRAP
7204490020 K D B NO 1 HEAVY MELTING STEEL SCRAP
7204490040 L D B NO 2 HEAVY MELTING STEEL SCRAP
7204490060 M D B CUT PLATE AND STRUCTURAL STEEL SCRAP
7204490070 N D B SHREDDED STEEL SCRAP
9505104010 O E C ARTIFICIAL CHRISTMAS TREES, OF PLASTIC
9505105010 P F C ARTIFICIAL CHRISTMAS TREES, EXCEPT OF PLASTIC
0203210000 Q G D CARCASSES AND HALF-CARCASSES OF SWINE, FROZEN
0203221000 R H D
HAMS, SHOULDERS AND CUTS THEREOF, OF SWINE, BONE IN, 
PROCESSED, FROZEN
0203229000 S I D
HAMS, SHOULDERS AND CUTS THEREOF, OF SWINE, BONE IN, 
EXCEPT PROCESSED, FROZEN
5209413000 T J E
WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING 85% OR MORE BY 
WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING MORE THAN 200G/M2 OF 
DIFFERENT COLORS PLAIN WV CERTIFIED HAND-LOOMED 
FABRIC
5209420030 U K E
WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING 85% OR GT BY 
WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING GT 200G/M2 OF YARNS OF 
DIFFERENT COLORS DENIM WEIGHING LE 360G/M2
5209420050 V K E
WOVEN FABRIC OF COTTON CONTAINING 85% OR MORE BY 
WEIGHT OF COTTON WEIGHING 360 G/M2 OF YARNS OF 
DIFFERENT COLORS DENIM
5209430000 W L E
WOVEN FABRICS OF COTTON, 85% OR MORE COTTON BY 
WEIGHT, WITH YARNS OF DIFFERENT COLORS, 3-THREAD OR 
4-THREAD TWILL INCLUDING CROSS TWILL, OVER 200 G/M2
Appendix B1:
Random Sample of Five Quality Groupings
* A relatively small fraction (about five percent) of all goods are unique up to 10 digits. In the random sample of five 5-
digit groups chosen, none of the goods were unique up to 10 digits in the Harmonized System Code.Appendix C− Retail and Wholesale Distribution
Assume there is a combined retail and wholesale distribution sector that purchases goods from
manufacturers, combines them with labor and then sells the modiﬁed product to searching consumers.
We show that this model generates export and retail prices that are similar to the baseline model.
Households: Assume there is a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods indexed by their position on
the unit interval i ∈ [0,1]. Ac o u n t r yj consumer sends shoppers, nj (i), with reservation prices, rj (i)
for each good i ∈ [0,1] and agents to work to solve



















This problem yields the following reservation price and demand equations,





















θ−1 di,a n dCj =
wjlj+πj
Pj . The term Rj measures the
minimum resource cost of a unit of consumption and the term Pj denotes the market price of a unit
of consumption. For the sake of exposition, we normalize Rj =1 . Given many identical households
solving the same problem, the aggregate demand curve is Dji(r)=nj (i) where rj (i)=wj + pj (i).
Distributor/Retailer: We assume that there are many independent ﬁrms that purchase good
i at pm (i) and then incur a cost cj to deliver the good to the consumer. Given the reservation price
of consumers, and the cost of production pm (i)+cj (i), this is the standard Burdett and Judd (1983)
problem, which we have shown generates the following average price
pretail




As we have already shown, this problem generates a distribution of retail prices with mean pretail
j (i)
and maximum price,




Producers: Given this retail price and reservation price and the aggregate demand curve, we
now can solve the producer’s maximization problem. Suppose that the producer’s cost is cm (i), then
the producer’s problem is








C ∗ (pm (i) − cm (i)).









θ . The producer’s markup depends on both its
own costs and the downstream costs including those of the consumer. 48


























wj/(1 − q(i)) + cm + cD (i)
θ
.
As before, the price at which the manufacturer sells to the foreign market is increasing in the
wage of the consumer. Moreover, it is now also increasing in the distribution cost in the destination
market. We show below that the relationships between wages and prices in the baseline model are
similar to those in the modiﬁed model with a distribution margin.
For comparison we modify the original model to include a local distribution cost and assume it
is borne by the manufacturer. The ﬁnal retail price will include this local cost. With the assumption
that the manufacturer distributes its own good, there is no market price at the border. To derive a
price at the border we assume that the gap between the retail price and the price at the border is the











border measures the price at the border and pdirect is the retail price.
Proposition 1 summarizes three results. First, the elasticity of reservation prices with respect to
wages is the same in both models. Second, the elasticity of retail prices is stronger with a distribution
sector so that there is more pricing-to-market at the retail level. Finally, we ﬁnd that pricing-to-market
at the border can be stronger or weaker in the model with distribution depending on the substitutability
of varieties and the search costs. Pricing-to-market at the border is more likely to be stronger when
varieties are less substitutable and more consumers have multiple oﬀers.
Proposition 1 With respect to wages, the elasticity of:
a. Reservation prices is the same in both models.
b. Retail prices is larger with distribution, even when there is no resource cost to distribution.
c. Border prices is larger in the model with distribution iﬀ q<
(1−θ)(1+τD)
(1+(1−θ)τD).
Even when no resources are used in distributing goods, as in our baseline model, we ﬁnd that
pricing-to-market at the retail level is stronger in the model with a separate distribution channel. This
occurs because now both the retailer and producer take into account how the local wage aﬀects the
demand for its good. Most important, because the producer has some market power it considers how
its price aﬀects the reservation price of the consumer.
48If downstream costs are proportional to upstream costs, then the producer charges a constant markup. For in-
stance, suppose that cj (i)=( 1 + τD)pm and wj (i)/(1 − q (i)) = (1 + τR)cD. Then, the optimal price is pm (i)=
cm
θ−(1−θ)(1+τD)[2+τR] and markups are constant.
39At the border, we ﬁnd that pricing-to-market can be stronger or weaker in the model with
retail distribution depending on the substitutability of varieties, search costs and distribution costs.
Pricing-to-market in export prices is more likely to be stronger when varieties are less substitutable,
more consumers have multiple oﬀers and downstream distribution costs are higher.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1










































































































































term on the LHS is increasing in τD so that adding a distribution sector leads to more pricing-
t o - m a r k e ta tt h eb o r d e r .



































































Share of US 
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(Value)
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Capita only
























































   Combined at the 9-Digit Level
   Combined at the 7-Digit Level
   Combined at the 5-Digit Level
Table 2: Effect of Quality Aggregation on Coefficients from










* t-statistics are based on country-year clustered White robust standard errors. ** Homogenous sample drops goods 
with descriptions "other,""not elsewhere specified or included," "NESOI," and "parts." 
Table 1: Coefficients from Commodity-Year Fixed-effects Regressions of
Log Prices on Log real GDP per capita and/or Log Wages                             
















* t-statistics are based on country-year clustered White robust standard errors.
Table 4: Coefficients from Commodity-Year Fixed-effects         
Regressions of Log Prices on  Log Wages by                     
Rauch Industry Classification                                 
(t-statistics in parentheses)*
MTUS countries: Canada (71, 81, 86, 92, 98), Denmark (64, 87) France (65, 74, 98), Netherlands (75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 00), Norway 
(71, 81, 90, 00), U.K. (61, 75,83, 87, 95,00), USA (65, 75, 85, 92, 98, 03), Hungary (65, 77), West Germany (65), Poland (65), 
Belgium (65), Bulgaria (88), Czechslovakia (65), East Germany (65), Yugoslavia (65), Italy (80, 89), Australia (74), Israel (92), 
Germany (92), Austria (92), S. Africa (00), Slovenia (00) and the sample is 20 to 59 year olds. 
* EHTUS work time is measured as paid work in primary and secondary employment. MTUS work time is measured as paid work 
in first and second job plus paid work at home.






Table 3: Coefficient from Regression of Log Time Use on Log GDP per capita
(t-statistics in parentheses)
EHTUS countries: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, U.K. and sample is 20 to 74 year olds.  TFP Labor TFP Labor
Productivity Productivity 
Tradables 0.56 1.85 0.67 2.07
Non-Tradables 0.27 1.60 0.26 1.41
Ratio (gN/T) 0.48 0.87 0.38 0.68
*The weighted measure weights productivity growth in each sector by its average annual share of value added in either the 
tradable or non-tradable sector. The productivity data is reported in Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). Total Factor Productivity 
Growth (TFP) is measured as a residual using materials, capital stocks, and labor used plus their expenditure shares.
Average Growth
Table 5: U.S. Sectoral Productivity Growth (1958-96)
Weighted Avg* Growth
Tradables include: Agriculture; Metal Mining; Coal Mining; Petroleum and Gas; Nonmetallic Mining; Food Products; Tobacco 
Products; Textile Mill Products; Apparel and Textile; Lumber; Furniture; Paper Products; Printing and Publishing;  Chemical 
Products; Petroleum Refining; Rubber and Plastics; Leather Products;  Primary Metals; Fabricated Metals; Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment; Electronic and Electric Equipment; Motor Vehicles; Instruments; Miscellaneous Manufacturing; 
Other Transportation Equipment; Stone, Clay and Glass.
Non-tradables include: Construction; Transport and Warehouse; Communications; Electric Utilities; Gas Utilities; Trade; 
FIRE; Services.Benchmark Model






¯ a =2 /3,
Preferences α =2 /3,ρ=0 .99








Low Trade Share α =0 .295







¯ a =0 .53
HBS q =0 .00005,¯ a =4
Standard α =2 /3
Low Trade α =0 .108
Measurement
Nominal Income Yj = Pj1 (Rj1)Nj1 + Pj2 (Rj2)Nj2 + P3j (R3j)N3j























lnPj = εPPP lnyj + ej
lnLOPj = εLOP lnyj + ej.
lnLOPj = εw lnwj + ej,
lnPNT
j /P T
j = εN/T lnyj + ej
Table 6: Parameter ValuesBalanced Low Labor Variable Low Trade Low Trade
Data PTM Benchmark  share = 1/2 Shopping α=0.295 Standard α=0.108
εPPP 0.430 0.107 0.245 0.283 0.232 0.430 0.128 0.430
εLOP 0.170 0.114 0.109 0.147 0.117 0.110 0.000 0.000
εw 0.162 0.115 0.111 0.151 0.115 0.115 0.000 0.000
εN/T 0.353 -0.022 0.406 0.410 0.345 0.453 0.384 0.482
εshop/work 0.330 1.041 0.968 0.962 0.332 0.987 0.988 1.024
Fraction of εPPP 24.9% 56.9% 65.9% 54.0% 100% 29.7% 100%
Fraction from PTM  26.6% 25.5% 34.1% 27.2% 25.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Fraction from HBS -1.7% 31.5% 31.8% 26.8% 74.3% 29.7% 100%
Variations on Biased Productivity Economies
Table 7: Model Results
PTM Model HBS Model
*εPPP and εN/T are based on the whole sample of 115 PWT Benchmark countries while εw and εLOP are based the 28 benchmark countries for which the BLS 
provides wage data.
**The variations of the Benchmark economy all include a biased productivity gap. In the HBS economies there is no pricing-to-market but consumers do 
shop for goods. Low labor share is the Benchmark economy with labor share of income of 1/2. The Vary Shop economy is one in which the shopping 
technology improves along with the tradable technology. The Low Trade Share economy is the Benchmark economy with a lower tradable share of 0.295. 
The HBS Low Trade is the HBS model with a low trade share of 0.108.
A. Elasticity*
B. Accounting for violations from PPP